Executive Summary

Major political events that took place in Sudan in the last 3 years ended with a military coup on 25th October 2021, as shown in the chronological chart below. After 30 years of military corrupted dictatorship regime, the 25th October coup cannot be separated from the massive corruption in the country.

In January 2019, a diverse combination of opposition parties, armed groups, and civil society organizations in Sudan, united under the common “Forces of Freedom & Change” Declaration. The protests were crowned in a sit-in in front of the military headquarters in Khartoum in April 2019. As junior officers undertook to protect demonstrators, leading generals of the military, national intelligence, security service and the Rapid Support Force -putting their mistrust of each other aside, to finally overthrow Al-Bashir. The military and popular protest leaders that defeated dictator Omar al-Bashir in April 2019 reached a constitutional document and agreement in August 2019 for shared government and gradual transfer of power to civilians. Later, relations between the civilian-led government and the military leaders deteriorated. Under the terms of the constitutional document, the military leader Burhan was scheduled to hand over the Sovereign Council’s chairmanship to a civilian head in November 2021. That step would have been the first time that civilians lead Sudan’s government in decades. The coup leaders had much to fear from this key transitional milestone, and that is why they committed a coup on 25th October 2021.

This portfolio analyzes the lack of integrity and corruption as the main drivers for that 25th October coup. The author intends to:

1. present in this case study a number of the relevant challenges in a wider context.
2. discuss the case’s significance and importance and, its short and its long-term impacts.
3. link the case to some general theories about the role of the military.
4. discuss the case (values vs. practices) and (v) most importantly, suggest some policies and their possible implementation to reduce/overcome this issue.

Case study discussion

Lack of integrity and corruption play a major role in military coups, especially in African countries. This portfolio argues that lack of integrity and corruption are the main factors behind the 25th October 2021 coup in Sudan, evidenced (see under) by the resulting regime increase in the level of corruption in turn. Kubbe and Engelbert (2017) suggest that high levels of corruption weaken democracy. Particularly in Sudan, it is widely assumed that military forces and security services pursue to protect their interests and are always motivated to coup a ruling regime when [they feel] their commercial interests are violated (El-Battahani, 2016). The vested interest of the military in Sudan calls El-Battahani (2016) to question its [dubious] intention to support peaceful and democratic change in the country as its claimed. Statistics show that the defense industries system under the defense ministry has more than 200 companies and that the Rapid Support Forces own a total of 250 companies working in several trading and production sectors (Sayigh, 2021). The military has a range of business, services and manufacturing giant companies like Giad, Danfodio, and Alhiloul Almutakamila that have always been privileged over other firms in the country’s mega projects (El-Battahani, 2016). Coup leaders used this money to keep the civilian-led government on life support as a paver to the 25th October coup (Gallopin, 2020). The Sudanese military controlled the country for 52 out of 65 years since independence, through deep entrenchment in major economic sectors like mining and agriculture (Soliman, 2021). Majeed and MacDonald (2010) support the argument that the main reason for military coups is to increase the military’s share in national resources. The graphs below show the military control of the Sudanese economy.

Although the lack of integrity and corruption and their resulting military takeovers were the main obstacles for Sudan’s democratic development, in a wider context the stability of democracy has always been threatened by military coups especially in Africa. Developing democracies are subject to friable military/civilian governmental balance. This is more applicable to countries with long traditions of military rule like Sudan and other African countries (Barracca, 2007, cited in Hunter, Rutland and King, 2020). Abu, Karim and Aziz (2015) agree that years of political instability due to numerous military coups obstructed economic development in African countries. From a broader perspective, this issue is contagious. Svolik (2015 cited in Hunter, Rutland and King, 2020) claims that coups’ risk increases by the presence of military authoritarian neighbors. Sudanese civilian politicians believe that the military coup and its paving steps were copied from al-Sisi’s book, which resulted in a military takeover in Egypt in 2013 (Waal, 2021). The October 25th coup hampered Sudan’s economic recovery, which heavily depends on international support. The US stopped $700 million assistance, the World Bank deferred $2 billion grants, and the write-off of $56 billion under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative is now threatened. Main debtors made it clear that this support is contingent on moving forward with political transition (Soliman, 2021).

Importance and significance of the case

Lack of integrity and corruption led to the 25th coup, which has a destructive short- and long-term impact on the country. Bennett, Bjornskov and Gohmann (2021) claim that military coups have a significant negative impact. Particularly in Sudan, military systems were the preferred model of governance over civil and constitutional institutions. This led to a pattern of extreme military spending instead of public spending (Madut, 2020). For example, El-Battahani (2016) mentions that military, police, and security took the majority of the country’s budget and the spending on these sectors increased from 78% to 88%. This section discusses the impact of lack of integrity and corruption in military and its resulting coups on (i) military spend vs. public spend (ii) corruption in military deals in despot regimes and (iii) preventing countries from progressing in democracy and good governance.

Consequent to military coups, it was evidenced that military sector spending increased compared to other sectors’ spending, in order to retain power, thus hindering the country’s development. Kameir and Kursany (1985 cited in Elamin, 2019) argue that corrupt governments spend a large portion of their budget on the army, security, and police to protect their power and that specifically in Sudan, spending on these non-productive sectors leads to the country’s underdevelopment. From a policy-making point of view, if the military resources are dedicated to other governmental sectors, this will result in an increase in growth per capita (d’Agostino, Dunne and Pieroni, 2012). Sandler and Hartley (1995, cited in d’Agostino, Dunne and Pieroni, 2016) assert that autocratic regimes assign more of their resources to the military compared to democracies.

Scholars argue that military spending and procurement are amongst the most corrupted areas. d’Agostino, Dunne and Pieroni (2016) claim that the military sector is afflicted by corruption more than other sectors. The limited competition and secrecy in the military sector result in more informal contracts, providing opportunities for the growth of corrupt practices (Gupta et al., 2001 cited in Elamin, 2019). Delavallade (2005 cited in d’Agostino, Dunne and Pieroni, 2012) claims that projects in the military sector are expected to involve a bigger amount of money thus attracting more and bigger bribes. Wilson et al., (2006 cited in Majeed and MacDonald, 2010) evidenced that governments tender out 50 % or more of their military procurement to a single supplier. A survey by Control Risks (2006), showed that one-third of international defense companies had lost a contract in the previous year because of competitor’s corruption (Majeed and MacDonald, 2010). Shleifer and Vishny (1993 cited in d’Agostino, Dunne and Pieroni, 2016) agree that large, specialized military projects such as bridges, missiles, and major weapons systems, which are expensive and difficult to determine their market value, give more opportunities for corruption.

Military coups in general, and the Sudan 25th coup specifically, hamper democracy, integrity, and good governance. By diverting resources from disadvantaged people, corruption in and during military regimes damages the rule of law and lowers the public trust of citizens in their political institutions. Leaders and beneficiaries from despot regimes normally block or slow political transition e.g., 25th Coup (Elamin, 2019). Military spending motivates military leaders to intervene in government to maintain or increase the share of the military in national resources (Majeed and MacDonald, 2010). The Military controls natural resources once it gets involved in the economic and political sphere of a country, and as controls on military leaders are limited, it is often that coup leaders will loot natural resources for themselves. (Abu, Karim and Aziz, 2015) blame military coups and corruption on political instability and underdevelopment in African countries. From the reviewed literature, it is evidenced that the military sector is one of the most corrupted sectors.

The above review and discussion support the portfolio’s general argument about the relationship between lack of integrity/corruption and military coups, as larger military spending and procurement are the inevitable outcomes when the military has a greater political role in ruling the country.

Theoretical underpinnings

Most professions including the military have a set of laws that give permissions, checks and balances and restraints. Professionals need a deep understanding of these laws to perform their duties. This section will discuss the theoretical underpinnings of military values and principles to support understanding this portfolio argument. Brinsfield (1998) defines professional ethics as the rules, principles, and standards set by the profession. Similar to legal ethics, medical ethics, and other professional ethics, military ethics is a set of professional ethics that help military officers to better understand the ethical requirements and enable them to act appropriately in performing their professional duties (Cook and Syse, 2010). Allen (2015) defines army ethics as the evolving set of values and laws embedded within the army and practiced by its officers, bound together by moral purpose. Kusch (2011) lists integrity amongst seven army values and defines it as doing what is right. Military officers are trained a lot about integrity and they cleave to this value for many years (Payman, 2017). In addition to its values, the military has an ethical climate, organizational climate, and organizational culture (Allen, 2015). The author agrees with Hurdlin (1994 cited in Majeed and MacDonald, 2010) that it is a moral obligation of the military to respect civilian control; this supports the key argument of this portfolio. While military culture adopts commitment to the seven values especially integrity (Allen, 2015), it seems that some Sudan military generals have a different culture. Al Sawarmi Khalid, an ex-military officer and current military studies lecturer, insisted in one of his television interviews that he teaches “international law” to junior officers in the military academy in Sudan. He claims that international law allows the military to take over power when “in its own discretion” believes that the country is under threat! (Aljazeera, 2021). The author believes that decades of military regimes changed Sudanese military culture from only protecting the borders, towards governing the country as well. Following the national Islamic Front’s coup in June 1989, the military got involved in the oil-rent industry – and expanded its role in business and economy. These features complicate the role of the military in political affairs and make it difficult to predict in the future (El-Battahani, 2016). Al-Bashir’s overthrown regime 1989-2019 set up a military-economic corporation to vest economic interest for the military in return for protecting the status quo. This involves providing consumption goods and vehicles to top officers of the military – a change in the culture that fomented close links not without conflict of interest between some military officers and the businessmen class (El-Battahani, 2016).

Discussion

After reviewing the general theoretical framework of military values in the previous section, it seems that there is a big gap in real life between theory and practices. The military should adhere to its values and true role, and sustain the trust conferred in its profession, but it appears that there are a lot of obligations and ethical challenges associated with this (Allen, 2015). The author defines the difference between what coups leaders claim vs. what they actually do as a deficit of integrity. Majeed and MacDonald (2010) claim that maximizing military generals’ personal wealth is easy after a military takeover through pay-offs in return to facilitate companies’ interests. Beyond their personal gain, Bennett, Bjornskov and Gohmann (2021) believe that coup makers are expected to grant gain for the group they represent. Particularly in Sudan and under al-Bashir’s regime, military generals benefited from unchecked control over key economic sectors, this resulted in them managing companies worth billions of dollars in value (Crisisgroup, 2021). The author agrees that Sudan coup leaders on many occasions gave up the important military value of integrity for their personal gain. While transparency is an important value that needs to be adhered to, it’s found that many big Sudanese military companies had never disclosed their holdings or released their finances to the public (Reuters, 2021). Many politicians consider the military’s business as under no obligation to be transparent and claim that their profits are not under the country’s budget. ‘Unacceptable’: Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok complained over the military huge economic activities, he proclaimed that their activities should be restricted to the defense industry (Aljazeera, 2020). Top military generals use the military budget for personal gains like increasing (their own) salaries, education and medical support [for their families] (Majeed and MacDonald, 2010). Gallopin (2020) argues that high-level malfeasance and conflicts of interest remove boundaries between public and private funds. According to Global Integrity (2006), military spending in Sudan is not disclosed and a huge budget is secretively used for security operations. The ministry of finance allegedly does not have records of defense and security expenditure (Elamin, 2019).

Oppositely to their justifications, Hoyle (2019) argues that whenever officers perceive their interests as threatened, they defend their positions through coups. Whereas the military uses corruption among other things to seize power, it has been accused of being involved in huge corruption after gaining it (Edi, 2006, cited in Abu, Karim and Aziz, 2015). Bennett, Bjornskov and Gohmann (2021) agree that while many coup leaders claimed that their intention was to fight corruption, the coup’s subsequent attempts succeeding has been disappointing. Fraham (2018) believes that after military coups, military officers take as much as they can with impunity as coups normally leave a political and security vacuum. In Sudan and as the deadline to transfer power to civilians in November 2021 approached, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok called for investigations about an expected military role in massacres and corruption under al-Bashir’s regime. The military worried that they will face uncontrollable investigations, military leaders also had fears that civilian rule would remove their major role in gold mining and exporting to Dubai (Marks, 2021). Accordingly, and contrary to their mandate of protecting the country, the military has colluded with a tribal leader to blockade Sudan’s eastern port and initiated domestic conflicts to prelude their coup. Military leader Burhan claimed that the 25th October coup was to protect the transition to democracy, but actions after 25 undermined his claims to be acting in the interests of democracy and civilian rule (Soliman, 2021). The author agrees that protecting the coup leaders’ interests was the main driver for the 25th October coup. The table below clearly demonstrates what coup leaders claimed vs. what they did actually.

What generals claimed to commit the 25th October coup	What they did on 25th Oct
Protect constitutional document	Suspended key articles of the constitutional document
Protect the revolution, the country, and promising to form a new government	Dissolute the sovereignty council and the council of ministers
Fight corruption	Frozen the work of the empowerment removal committee
Ensure democratic transition	Declared a state of emergency and disconnected internet from the entire country
The army will hand power over to a democratically elected government	Arrested members of the transitional government and other civilian leaders. More than 50 were killed in peaceful protests from 25 October to 31 December 2021

Before committing the 25th October coup, military leaders put obstacles in front of the empowerment elimination, anti-corruption, and funds recovery committee, while they were supposed to be the first to support it. The committee was formed in December 2019 as a result of the constitutional document and was established originally to dismantle political and economic leftovers of the dictator al-Bashir regime (Sayigh, 2021). The committee did not only expose and uproot the companies owned by the Islamists regime forced out of power in April 2019, but also the network of the companies owned by the military empire and its generals. Fighting corruption by the committee and reforming the security sector were other factors that worried the military generals (Waal, 2021). The author believes that this was the main reason for the coup leaders to commit the 25 October coup. In a broader context, it seems that Africa, and ‘not only Sudan’, faces a similar dilemma of military involvement in politics and corruption. African coups leaders use the same justifications to justify their coups. Frahm (2018) calls it the bane of African countries. For example, Kieh and Agbese (2004 cited in Majeed and MacDonald, 2010) claim that despite fighting corruption has always been the reason for coups in Africa but, in practice, once the military is in power, it does not show a lesser propensity towards corruption. This was evidenced in Ghana, Zaire, Nigeria, and other countries. For example, general Sese Seko and general Abacha were alleged to transfer Zaire and Nigeria budgets respectively into their private accounts. Congo is a clear example where the country became a veritable treasure for military leaders who stole resources with their civilian allies and got engaged in smuggling diamonds and gold to Uganda. Bakongida Aliyu, the Niger state governor claimed that the military rule has eroded services in all national economy sectors (Majeed and MacDonald, 2010). Nigeria’s military rulers were accused of stealing and mismanaging billions of dollars of the country’s budget (Abu, Karim and Aziz, 2015). Frahm (2017) agrees that transitional processes in Nigeria have always been corrupted.

Military intervention in the political process is very harmful to the democratic process and accountability. This involvement implies the distortion of government policy and directions towards democracy. Majeed and MacDonald (2010) suggest that in the longer term the risk of the military takeover will certainly rise for two reasons: the system will become corrupt and the continuation of such a government might create an armed opposition. They also argue that the threat of military committing coups can force governments to change their policy and regulations in line with the military desires. From the previous examples, the author supports the argument that corruption and lack of integrity are the main reasons for coups in Africa in general and Sudan coup 25th October 2021 in specific. In an apology for a photo with Trump, general Mark A. Milley, the chairman of USA Joint Chiefs of Staff, said “I should not have been there, my presence in that moment and in that environment created a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.” (Cooper, 2020). The author believes that militaries should not intervene in politics as in this example.

Policy recommendations and Implementation

This section suggests measures to resolve the complicated problems resulting from military integrity and corruption, coups, and political intervention of militaries. The author suggests two dimensions for the solution, professional and political measures. Professional measures include important aspects like transparency, governance, and training. Elamin (2019) recommends promoting transparency to its greatest extent and disclosing military records of expenditure. The author strongly agrees with Sayigh, (2021) that in Sudan, only defense-related companies shall remain under military command with full financial disclosure, while civilian businesses owned by the military should be converted into public limited companies. Payman (2017) recommends establishing an anti-corruption council in the ministry of defense focusing on the abuse of power and high-value procurement; also the security sector should build sector-specific anti-corruption expertise. Courses and training on military ethics should be enhanced in all stages of the military curricula (Brinsfield, 1998). Payman (2017) argues that specialized anti-corruption training, developing a code of conduct for military personnel, and holding the military accountable for their expenditure are important measures to prevent corruption. The author believes that these measures would go a long way towards helping restore the Sudanese military doctrine to its foremost and only mandate of protecting the country’s borders.

Political measures include military relationship management and its laws and regulations. Payman (2017) recommends that purchases over a certain threshold should be approved by the parliament. Hunter, Rutland, and King (2020) suggest that in order to avoid military coups, elected regimes should cooperate with the military, but to ensure that the military does not play a central role in the government. Hoyle (2019) believes that high popular support for democracy and consensus against military rule is needed to stop military-political intervention. However, in countries in a transition like Sudan, the author agrees with Soliman (2021) that civilians may have to accept a role for the military in return for military-political concessions. Particularly in Sudan, the author agrees with Sayigh (2021) that international pressure is as important, and as crucial, as the domestic one in supporting democratic transition. The international community should exert pressure -like the US government, which issued Sudan democratic transition, accountability and fiscal transparency act (SDTAFTA) that specifies that all assets and finances, including the ones belonging to the army and security forces, should be controlled by civilians (Sayigh, 2021).

The author agrees that military activities should be limited only to the defense industry. Madut (2020) recommends that Sudan should uphold the law and order by promulgating a permanent constitution. The author adds that adoption of the above measures and the annunciation of the country’s long-awaited permanent constitution should clearly avert or prevent military intervention in political affairs.

Conclusion

From the reviewed literature and relevant news and articles, it is concluded that corruption and lack of integrity are the main reasons for military coups in Africa, and the 25th October coup in Sudan, in our view, is a flagrant example. Various studies showed the distorting effect of military coups that significantly adds to the plague of malfeasance and corruption in a country, this effect is due to the presence of military generals in politics, resulting in the military encroachment on key administrative positions in profitable sectors, and controlling the country’s resources and increasing military spending instead of investing on other important sectors like education, health, and productive activities. It is evidenced that coup leaders commit and stage coups to exploit military spending for their own private gain, as the military sector is least accountable to the public. Military coups also hinder democratic transition and promote corruption (Majeed and MacDonald, 2010). El-Battahani (2016) claims that in Africa, and in Sudan in particular, the military plays several roles at different times beyond its mandate of protecting the country’s borders, relying on power formations and pending on private interests at the time of coups and intervention. The Sudan military historic legacy of coups, intervention and meddling into political affairs, is inseparably combined with corruption, lack of integrity, private commercial interests, together with the exploitation of scarce resources of a poor country. This undoubtedly led to trapping the country in extended conflicts since its independence.

Without properly addressing this crucial issue, the country will perpetuate in misrule mired by dictatorship, underdevelopment, endemic malfeasance and mismanagement, poverty, and insecurity for decades to come. Although the relation between corruption and coups is extremely complex as it is important, it is also very challenging to study, analyze and resolve, for it stems from the political, and possibly deep-rooted and tied to cultural, and institutional settings of each country –factors which are diverse and usually hard to quantify. This portfolio tried to further understand and analyze this complex relationship in the case of Sudan, and to propose some solutions.

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